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The doctrine of nonintervention, a staple of traditional international law, provides that 
each state should refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. This 
prohibition includes not only military intervention, but also, in Hersh lauterpacht’s 
formulation, all “dictatorial interference in the sense of action amounting to denial of the 
independence of the state.”1 Directly linked to this obligation is the notion of state 
sovereignty which has, at different times, enjoyed a wide and varied interpretation. 
However, as commonly understood, sovereignty implies that the only source of power 
within the geographic confines of a state is the state itself; hence any intervention in 




The norm of nonintervention continues to be serviceable, and provides the primary 
foundation on which international laws and relations are erected, principally because it 
recognizes the need to accept and respect the geographic, ethnic, religious, and cultural 
integrity of nations.3
 
 Furthermore, the norm internationalizes the doctrine of self-
determination, and the acceptance that a viable state and its people have the right to exist 
without fear of foreign aggression or interference in purely domestic matters. In principle, 
this customary rule of nonintervention gives substance, and sustains the doctrine of state 
sovereignty. 
The duty of nonintervention, however, is not based on moral grounds. It is predicated on 
the assumption that a state, once recognized as such by the community of nations, enjoys 
sovereign powers. This practice makes no distinction between a de facto sovereign power 
and the legitimate exercise of power in the sense that legitimacy derives from the 
governed.4 Nonintervention may also be given a different interpretation; which is, that 
the obligation of noninterference in a state’s domestic matters is owed, not to the target 
state, but to the international community at large as a means to peace. This view 
comports well with the United Nation’s Charter, and its primary objective of world peace 
and security.5
 
 Like the former, this alternate interpretation also lacks moral dimensions, 
for world peace and international security are insufficient basis to confer sovereign 
powers on any state, especially one that lacks the informed consent of its citizenry. It 
must then be the case that a state should be a legitimate sovereign in order to claim the 
benefits and the moral duty of nonintervention. 
The defeat of Germany in the Second World War, and the subsequent birth of the United 
Nations in 1945 ushered in the modern human rights regime. Prior to this post-war era, 
human rights were not salient in the parlance of international law, and for good reason; 
nation-states were guided by the civility of the ‘good-neighbor,’ which meant that a 
‘good-neighbor’ does not interfere or unilaterally intervene in matters of purely domestic 
character, and outside its territorial competence. Formally, the ‘good-neighbor’ ethos 
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came under the umbrella of state sovereignty, and to a large extent, continued to dictate 
how states dealt with one another even after the advent of the UN, and its consequence on 
human rights remained unchanged: states continued to regard human rights as domestic 
matters that should be dealt with domestically, any outside intervention was considered 
‘bad form’ and an affront to the norm of state sovereignty. 
 
In pre-UN era, international law was almost exclusively concerned with rules that 
informed and governed relationships amongst states; however, the creation of the United 
Nations formalized the international community’s desire to internationalize human rights, 
and make them a proper domain of international law.6 This coupling of human rights and 
traditional international law has so far not created a stable and sustainable ‘marriage’. 
The consequence has been a perennial tension between human rights law and the original 
elements of traditional international law (state sovereignty, nonintervention); solutions to 




One such debate is whether a state should be permitted to shield itself with the doctrine of 
state sovereignty while it engages in systematic violations of the internationally 
guaranteed rights of its citizens.8 Directly linked to this debate is the question of when the 
duty of nonintervention may be set-aside in observance of the moral ‘duty’ of 
humanitarian intervention? The commonly held view is that contemporary international 
law, as informed by the UN Charter and custom, forbids all forms of intervention in the 
affairs of a sovereign, even those compelled by humanitarian sentiments.9 A more radical 
view, and one that is rapidly gaining currency, begs to differ; it espouses the notion that 
the benefits of sovereignty should only be available to states with political and moral 
legitimacy, and that absent such legitimacy, the duty of nonintervention may be set aside 
on humanitarian grounds.10
 
 This essay adopts the latter view on the assumption that 
modern international relations, and developments in the field of human rights would 
ultimately compel a different interpretation of customary international law, and create an 
alternative norm to that of nonintervention. NATO’s actions in Kosovo in 1999 may have 
ushered-in the requisite ‘wind’ of change! 
Contemporary And Customary International Law                              
In contemporary international law, treaties, declarations, and understandings generally 
constitute the primary modalities by which states bind themselves and create obligations. 
These modalities are considered opinio juris for they generally express statements of legal 
obligations and the legality of undertakings. Unlike traditional customary law that 
emphasizes state practice, the rules and regulations generated by contemporary 
international law tend to be idealistic and aspirational, and not expressive of reality;11
 
 and 
therein lies its strongest criticism -- it seldom describes state practices, but rather 
prescribes rules and obligations that should guide international relations and conducts.  
Customary international law, however, is universally assumed to embody two elements – 
state practice, and opinio juris. The past behavior of a state in regard to particular matters, 
if consistent, gives evidence of state practice. Opinio juris requires that the state, in 
adopting a particular practice, believes that it is legally obligated to do so. The usefulness 
 4 
of custom as a source of contemporary international law has been the subject of 
significant debate in recent years.12 These debates notwithstanding, the case law of the 
International Court of Justice, and commentaries by legal scholars have re-emphasized 
custom as a resilient source of international law, especially in the area of human rights. 
But custom in its traditional understanding, cannot, in the light of recent developments in 
the international arena, play as big a role as it once did. But can an international norm 
develop on the basis of state practice or opinio juris alone? Kirgis asserts that it can, and 




NATO In Kosovo 
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in the civil and armed 
conflict in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 ostensibly to avert an “eminent humanitarian 
catastrophe” and to foreclose the potential destabilizing effects of the conflict.14 Then and 
now, questions abound on the lawfulness of the intervention, and its precedential 
consequences. There is unmistakable evidence that the armed forces of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, committed 
gross international crimes against ethnic Albanians in the country. Ethnic Albanians are 
not, however, without blame, for they also inflicted horrible crimes against the Serbs;15
 
 
and as the conflict worsened, the incredible act of “ethnic cleansing” reminded the world 
of the Nazi’s holocaust. 
NATO’s intervention through its bombing campaign was indeed a violation of customary 
international law, and the United Nation’s Charter that forbids states from forcible 
intervention in the domestic affairs of another state unless such action is sanctioned by 
the UN Security Council or undertaken on the grounds of self-defense.16
 
 But the 
overriding question of import is whether, under contemporary international law, this 
norm of nonintervention may be breached on strong evidence of gross human rights 
violations. 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention may provide the best explanation for NATO’s 
activities in Kosovo. While this doctrine is not an exception to United Nation’s Article 
2(4),17 it is also equally clear that contemporary international law, and the UN Charter 
prohibit states from gross violations of both humanitarian, and human rights laws. The 
duty to abstain from these violations is owed to the international community, and in the 
recent past, states have intervened in the domestic affairs of other states, e.g. Granada, 
Panama, northern Iraq, ostensibly on evidence of a breach of this duty.18
 
 But these 
instances are seldom justified on the unequivocal right of humanitarian intervention; thus 
they lack the requisite precedential value to establish a norm that permits states to 
unilaterally or collectively intervene on humanitarian grounds. Unlike these other 
instances, however, the intervention in Kosovo is significant, and may have the capacity 
to change contemporary international law on state sovereignty. 
State Sovereignty and the Duty of Nonintervention are not ‘Carved in Stone’.                            
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In Nicaragua v. US,19
 
 the International Court of Justice considered, among other issues, 
questions pertaining to the accusation of totalitarianism, and human rights abuses. In 
addressing these issues, the Court wrote: 
“ The Court would not therefore normally consider it appropriate to engage in a 
verification of the truth of assertions of this kind. A state’s domestic policy falls within its 
exclusive jurisdiction, provided of course that it does not violate any obligation of  
international law. Every State possesses a fundamental right to choose and implement its 
own political, economic and social systems.”20
 
 
The question of universal import in this instance, therefore, must be whether human 
rights abuses, and a State’s practice of totalitarianism that denies its citizens the basic 
elements of democracy are matters of exclusive domestic concern. The Court’s dicta in 
the Nicaraguan case answer this question in the affirmative, to which Teson responds ---  
 
“..[ T]he Court denied, as a matter of principle, its own power to discuss human rights 
and totalitarianism because, absent some commitment, they “essentially” fell within the 
domestic jurisdiction of Nicaragua. If this is what the Court meant, the court brushed 
aside one of the most cherished modern conquest of mankind: the notion that 
governments are not free to treat their citizens as they please, even if they are not parties 
to specific human rights convention. ….”21
 
 
The notion that States are free to adopt any economic and political system without 
outside interference is an old one, it reflects the essence of traditional international law, 
and the doctrine of state sovereignty. But it is important to note here that there cannot be 
a moral equivalency between a state’s freedom to choose, and the international rights 
guaranteed to its citizens. For, according to Teson, “words such as “freedom,” 
“autonomy” and “equal liberty” have a different and unclear meaning when used for 
nation-states than they do for individuals.”22 Furthermore, “ …only persons can pursue 
rational ends and be autonomous in a moral sense, and we indeed have a moral duty not 
to interfere with their choices….But states are not persons, and although governments are 
made of persons, their moral rights……are not grounded in any mystical qualities of the 




Generally, an international norm may be replaced if it is consistently breached by states, 
and the new state practice acquires opinio juris. However, in a 1986 ruling, the 
International Court of Justice24 stated that in order to replace the old rule, the new 
practice must be based on an alternative rule of law. Thus, depending on the grounds 
adduced by NATO, its action may be interpreted as based on an ‘alternative rule of 
law.’25 But this interpretation runs into difficulties when applied to international laws 
based on treaties. The UN Charter’s prohibitions on forcible intervention is treaty-based, 
and according to the terms of the UN Charter, all international laws in conflict with the 
provisions of the Charter on or after the treaty went into effect are void.26 This simply 
means that in order for NATO’s action in Kosovo to assume an international norm, 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter may have to be amended.  
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Article 2(4) of the UN charter forbids the unilateral use of force against another country 
even on purely humanitarian grounds.27 The reason for this provision is sufficiently clear 
----- the mighty and powerful can be mischievous! Even the collective use of force by 
like-minded nations to stop gross violations of human rights may run counter to UN 
prohibitions, unless such action has the explicit blessing of the UN Security Council. And 
herein lies the problem with the UN Security Council --- it seldom acts with a sense of 
urgency when it has to, and when it does the impetus to act is never exclusively 
humanitarian. Politics, and the biases of the more powerful member states have 
consistently guided its actions in terms of when and where.28
 
 
While NATO’s action in Kosovo is violative of contemporary international law, it may 
be justified on moral and humanitarian grounds. The sovereignty of a state is never 
absolute; its legitimacy derives, in the main, from its citizens, and when it elects to abuse 
the fundamental rights of those it purports to represent, then morality demands that it 
surrenders the benefits of sovereignty. NATO, by its action in Kosovo, may have nudged 
contemporary international law towards its inevitable path; the US simply followed that 
path into Iraq. 
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